SLOs | Cooperation

Welcome to the Cooperation Models module! This module explores one of the most fundamental questions in social science: how and why do humans cooperate? We’ll use game theory and agent-based modeling to understand the conditions that promote or hinder cooperation in social systems.

Cooperation models help us understand how individuals can work together for mutual benefit, even when short-term self-interest might suggest otherwise. Through computational modeling, we’ll explore classic cooperation dilemmas, evolutionary strategies, and the role of reputation, punishment, and reward systems in maintaining cooperative behavior. We’ll examine foundational work from Axelrod on the evolution of cooperation, Ostrom’s principles for governing commons, and contemporary research on institutional design and collective action.

Module Duration: 2 weeks

👩🏾‍🎓 Student Learning Objectives (SLOs)¶

By the end of this module, students will be able to accomplish the following SLOs:

Core SLOs¶

• Develop students’ understanding of biblically-guided norms of justice, equality, freedom, and stewardship.

• Increase students’ knowledge of social systems and of human behavior within such systems (revisited in the context of cooperation and dilemmas).

• Apply algorithmic, statistical, and/or mathematical methods to solve problems (as applied to cooperation and social dilemmas).

Conceptual SLOs¶

• Explain the fundamental cooperation dilemmas (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Goods, etc.)

• Understand evolutionary approaches to cooperation and reciprocity

• Analyze the role of institutions, norms, and sanctions in promoting cooperation

• Evaluate different mechanisms for solving collective action problems

Technical SLOs¶

• Implement game theory models in NetLogo

• Model evolutionary strategies and fitness landscapes

• Simulate reputation systems and social learning mechanisms

• Analyze equilibrium outcomes and stability conditions

Critical Thinking¶

• Assess the conditions under which cooperation emerges and persists

• Evaluate the effectiveness of different institutional designs

• Critique the assumptions of rational choice and evolutionary models

• Connect cooperation theory to real-world social and political challenges

Communication¶

• Present game theory concepts to diverse audiences

• Discuss the implications of cooperation research for policy design

• Articulate the tension between individual and collective interests

• Engage with debates about human nature and social institutions

📚 Readings and Extra Materials¶

🔒 Required Readings¶

The required readings for this module are available by 📖 clicking in this link. You have to be logged in with your Calvin account to access them.

1. 📖 Axelrood (1984). “The Evolution of Cooperation”. Basic Books, Introduction + Chapter 1.

2. 📖 Elinor Ostrom (1990). “Governing the Commons”. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1 excerpts.

🔒 Supplementary Readings¶

1. 📖 Nowak, M. A. (2006). “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation”. Science, 314(5805), 1560-1563.

2. 📖 Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). “Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments”. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.

3. 📖 Axelrod, R. (1980). “Effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3-25.

4. 📖 Ostrom, E. (2009). “A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems”. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.

5. 📖 Smaldino (2023). Modeling social behavior: Mathematical and agent-based models of social dynamics and cultural evolution. Chapter 6.

🎥 Videos¶

• Dominant Strategy, Nash Equilibrium & Dominant Strategy Equilibrium in Simultaneous Move Games

• Elephants Show Cooperation on Test

• Ants vs Humans - T Shape Problem Solving Test

• Robber’s Cave Experiment - Realistic Conflict Theory

• The Dark Psychology Behind the Milgram Experiment | Why 65% Obeyed

• Psychological Experiment

🔗 Online Resources¶

• The Evolution of Trust (Interactive)

• Game Theory Society Resources

• Axelrod Python Library

• Prisoner’s Dilemma Lab

• Public Goods Game Simulator

🏺 Historical Context¶

The Development of Cooperation Theory¶

Game Theory Foundations:

• Von Neumann & Morgenstern (2007). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.

• Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. PNAS, 36(1), 48-49.

• Tucker (1950). A two-person dilemma. Stanford University Press.

Evolutionary Approaches:

• Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 1-16.

• Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.

• Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press.

Institutional Analysis:

• Olson (1965). The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press.

• Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.

• Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.

🌎 Real-World Applications¶

Natural Resource Management:

• Community forestry and fisheries management

• Water allocation and irrigation systems

• Common pool resource governance

• Climate change cooperation

Organizational Behavior:

• Team collaboration and productivity

• Corporate social responsibility

• Supply chain cooperation

• Innovation networks and knowledge sharing

International Relations:

• Trade agreements and economic cooperation

• Environmental treaties and compliance

• Security alliances and peacekeeping

• Global governance institutions

Discussion Questions:

• Why do some communities successfully manage common resources while others fail?

• How can organizations design incentives to promote teamwork?

• What role does culture play in cooperation and trust?

• How can technology facilitate or hinder cooperative behavior?

Contemporary Challenges:

• Digital commons and open source collaboration

• Platform cooperatives and gig economy governance

• Global cooperation on pandemic response

• Corporate cooperation on sustainability goals