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Welcome to the Cooperation Models module! This module explores one of the most fundamental questions in social science: how and why do humans cooperate? We’ll use game theory and agent-based modeling to understand the conditions that promote or hinder cooperation in social systems.

Cooperation models help us understand how individuals can work together for mutual benefit, even when short-term self-interest might suggest otherwise. Through computational modeling, we’ll explore classic cooperation dilemmas, evolutionary strategies, and the role of reputation, punishment, and reward systems in maintaining cooperative behavior. We’ll examine foundational work from Axelrod on the evolution of cooperation, Ostrom’s principles for governing commons, and contemporary research on institutional design and collective action.

Module Duration: 2 weeks

Student Learning Objectives (SLOs)

By the end of this module, students will be able to:

Core SLOs
Conceptual SLOs
Technical SLOs
Critical Thinking
Communication
  • Develop students’ understanding of biblically-guided norms of justice, equality, freedom, and stewardship.
  • Increase students’ knowledge of social systems and of human behavior within such systems (revisited in the context of cooperation and dilemmas).
  • Apply algorithmic, statistical, and/or mathematical methods to solve problems (as applied to cooperation and social dilemmas).

📋 Weekly Breakdown

Lecture 13
Lecture 14
Lecture 15
Lecture 16

Week 7: Tuesday, October 14

Heckman Library 406C

Session A (Lab): Finishing our SIR model and calculating the R-naught.

  • Summary:
    • Completing the SIR model in NetLogo
    • Calculating the basic reproduction number (R0)
    • Exploring parameter effects on epidemic dynamics
    • Running simulations and analyzing outcomes

Session B (Lab): Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma—strategy space & ecology.

📝 Assignments & Due Dates (Weeks 7–8)

Lab Memo #5

Due: 10/23 before class | Points: 25 points

Prompt (3-4 pages):

Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament implementation & analysis

  1. Program classic strategies (Tit-for-Tat, Always Cooperate, Always Defect, etc.) in NetLogo
  2. Run tournament simulations with different strategy populations
  3. Analyze strategy performance under different conditions
  4. Design and test your own original strategy
  5. Write your Lab Memo analyzing the results. You can download the template here.
  6. Make sure you document your strategy implementations and interface modifications.
  7. Submit your Lab Memo in PDF format through Moodle.

Resources:

Week 7 (Oct 14 & 16)

Assignment TypeDetailsDue DateWeight
📖 SRG Prep Sheet #6Ostrom & Axelrod readingsTue Oct 16 (start of class)Participation
🧪 Lab Memo #5IPD tournament implementation & analysisThu Oct 23 (start of class)5%

Week 8 (Oct 21 & 23)

Assignment TypeDetailsDue DateWeight
🎓 Project Proposal (1 page)Finalized project scope and cooperation mechanismsThu Oct 23 (end of day)Project milestone

📚 Reading and Extra Materials

Required Readings

Week 7 Reading

Robert Axelrod (1984)
The Evolution of Cooperation
Basic Books, Introduction + Chapter 1.

Key concepts:

  • The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for cooperation
  • Iterated vs. one-shot interactions
  • Success of Tit-for-Tat strategy
  • Evolutionary stability and reciprocity

Discussion questions:

  1. Why does Tit-for-Tat succeed in tournaments despite its simplicity?
  2. How do repeated interactions change cooperation dynamics?
  3. What real-world situations resemble the Prisoner’s Dilemma?

Elinor Ostrom (1990)
Governing the Commons
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1 excerpts.

Key concepts:

  • Common pool resource dilemmas
  • Tragedy of the commons vs. successful self-governance
  • Design principles for stable resource institutions
  • Polycentric governance systems

Discussion questions:

  1. What makes some communities successfully manage common resources while others fail?
  2. How do Ostrom’s design principles relate to cooperation theory?
  3. Can institutional design overcome individual self-interest?

Supplementary Materials

Videos
Articles
NetLogo Models
Online Resources

Historical Context

The Development of Cooperation Theory

Game Theory Foundations:

  • Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.
  • Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. PNAS, 36(1), 48-49.
  • Tucker, A. W. (1950). A two-person dilemma. Stanford University Press.

Evolutionary Approaches:

  • Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 1-16.
  • Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.
  • Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press.

Institutional Analysis:

  • Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press.
  • Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
  • Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.

Real-World Applications

Cooperation in Action

Natural Resource Management:

  • Community forestry and fisheries management
  • Water allocation and irrigation systems
  • Common pool resource governance
  • Climate change cooperation

Organizational Behavior:

  • Team collaboration and productivity
  • Corporate social responsibility
  • Supply chain cooperation
  • Innovation networks and knowledge sharing

International Relations:

  • Trade agreements and economic cooperation
  • Environmental treaties and compliance
  • Security alliances and peacekeeping
  • Global governance institutions

Discussion Questions:

  • Why do some communities successfully manage common resources while others fail?
  • How can organizations design incentives to promote teamwork?
  • What role does culture play in cooperation and trust?
  • How can technology facilitate or hinder cooperative behavior?

Contemporary Challenges:

  • Digital commons and open source collaboration
  • Platform cooperatives and gig economy governance
  • Global cooperation on pandemic response
  • Corporate cooperation on sustainability goals

Additional Tools & Resources

Tools and Software

Interactive Demos:

Tools and Software:

  • 💻 Axelrod Python Library: Tournament analysis and strategy development
  • 📊 Gambit: Game theory software for analysis and computation
  • 🎨 NetworkX: Python library for network-based cooperation models
  • 📈 R Cooperation Package: Statistical analysis of cooperation experiments

Study Groups and Office Hours:

  • 👥 Study Group Sessions: Fridays 5-7 PM, Science Building 180
  • 🕐 Instructor Office Hours: Mondays & Wednesdays 3-5 PM
  • 💬 Course Discord: #cooperation-models channel for game theory discussions

📚 Slides and Readings

Required Readings

Core Reading Materials

  1. Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3-25.

    • 📖 PDF Download
    • 🎯 Focus on: Tournament results and the success of Tit-for-Tat

  2. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. Selected chapters on institutional design principles.

    • 📖 PDF Download
    • 🎯 Focus on: Design principles for stable resource institutions

  3. Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560-1563.

    • 📖 PDF Download
    • 🎯 Focus on: Mechanisms that promote cooperation evolution

  4. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.

    • 📖 PDF Download
    • 🎯 Focus on: The role of punishment in maintaining cooperation

Historical Context

The Development of Cooperation Theory

Game Theory Foundations:

  • Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.
  • Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. PNAS, 36(1), 48-49.
  • Tucker, A. W. (1950). A two-person dilemma. Stanford University Press.

Evolutionary Approaches:

  • Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 1-16.
  • Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.
  • Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press.

Institutional Analysis:

  • Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press.
  • Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
  • Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.

Real-World Applications

Cooperation in Action

Natural Resource Management:

  • Community forestry and fisheries management
  • Water allocation and irrigation systems
  • Common pool resource governance
  • Climate change cooperation

Organizational Behavior:

  • Team collaboration and productivity
  • Corporate social responsibility
  • Supply chain cooperation
  • Innovation networks and knowledge sharing

International Relations:

  • Trade agreements and economic cooperation
  • Environmental treaties and compliance
  • Security alliances and peacekeeping
  • Global governance institutions

Discussion Questions:

  • Why do some communities successfully manage common resources while others fail?
  • How can organizations design incentives to promote teamwork?
  • What role does culture play in cooperation and trust?
  • How can technology facilitate or hinder cooperative behavior?

Contemporary Challenges:

  • Digital commons and open source collaboration
  • Platform cooperatives and gig economy governance
  • Global cooperation on pandemic response
  • Corporate cooperation on sustainability goals
References
  1. Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560–1563. 10.1126/science.1133755
  2. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980–994. 10.1257/aer.90.4.980
  3. Ostrom, E. (2009). A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. Science, 325(5939), 419–422. 10.1126/science.1172133
Course Modules
Module 3: Contagion
Course Modules
Module 5: Polarization