Welcome to the Cooperation Models module! This module explores one of the most fundamental questions in social science: how and why do humans cooperate? We’ll use game theory and agent-based modeling to understand the conditions that promote or hinder cooperation in social systems.
Cooperation models help us understand how individuals can work together for mutual benefit, even when short-term self-interest might suggest otherwise. Through computational modeling, we’ll explore classic cooperation dilemmas, evolutionary strategies, and the role of reputation, punishment, and reward systems in maintaining cooperative behavior. We’ll examine foundational work from Axelrod on the evolution of cooperation, Ostrom’s principles for governing commons, and contemporary research on institutional design and collective action.
Module Duration: 2 weeks
Student Learning Objectives (SLOs)¶
By the end of this module, students will be able to:
Develop students’ understanding of biblically-guided norms of justice, equality, freedom, and stewardship.
Increase students’ knowledge of social systems and of human behavior within such systems (revisited in the context of cooperation and dilemmas).
Apply algorithmic, statistical, and/or mathematical methods to solve problems (as applied to cooperation and social dilemmas).
Explain the fundamental cooperation dilemmas (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Goods, etc.)
Understand evolutionary approaches to cooperation and reciprocity
Analyze the role of institutions, norms, and sanctions in promoting cooperation
Evaluate different mechanisms for solving collective action problems
Implement game theory models in NetLogo
Model evolutionary strategies and fitness landscapes
Simulate reputation systems and social learning mechanisms
Analyze equilibrium outcomes and stability conditions
Assess the conditions under which cooperation emerges and persists
Evaluate the effectiveness of different institutional designs
Critique the assumptions of rational choice and evolutionary models
Connect cooperation theory to real-world social and political challenges
Present game theory concepts to diverse audiences
Discuss the implications of cooperation research for policy design
Articulate the tension between individual and collective interests
Engage with debates about human nature and social institutions
📋 Weekly Breakdown¶
Week 7: Tuesday, October 14
Heckman Library 406C
Session A (Lab): Finishing our SIR model and calculating the R-naught.
Summary:
Completing the SIR model in NetLogo
Calculating the basic reproduction number (R0)
Exploring parameter effects on epidemic dynamics
Running simulations and analyzing outcomes
Session B (Lab): Creating graphics and monitors for the SIR Model
Summary:
Building visualizations for the SIR model dynamics
Implementing monitors for key epidemiological metrics (e.g., infection rate, recovery rate)
Analyzing the impact of different parameters on model behavior
Code: SIR Model
Week 7: Thursday, October 16
Heckman Library 406C
Session A: Cooperation & social dilemmas (commons, reciprocity).
Summary:
Introduction to cooperation dilemmas: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Goods, Tragedy of the Commons
Game theory basics and payoff structures
Applications to resource management and collective action
Session B (SRG): Discussion of readings.
Summary:
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990), Ch. 1
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), Ch. 1
Deliverable: SRG prep sheet due (per role).
Week 8: Tuesday, October 21
NO CLASS (Advising Day)
Week 8: Thursday, October 23
Heckman Library 406C
Session A (Lab): Cooperation in a Structured Environment
Summary:
Coding a Cooperation Model in NetLogo
Prisioners’ Dilemma implementation in a Lattice environment
Creating mechanism charts for cooperation dynamics
Defining interaction rules and decision-making processes
Session B (Lab): Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma—strategy space & ecology.
Summary:
Building IPD tournament models in NetLogo
Implementing classic strategies (Tit-for-Tat, Always Cooperate, Always Defect, etc.)
Running tournament simulations with different strategy populations
Code: PD Tournament Template
📝 Assignments & Due Dates (Weeks 7–8)¶
Due: 10/30 before class | Points: 25 points
Prompt (3-4 pages):
Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament implementation & analysis
Program classic strategies (Tit-for-Tat, Always Cooperate, Always Defect, etc.) in NetLogo
Run tournament simulations with different strategy populations
Analyze strategy performance under different conditions
Design and test your own original strategy
Write your Lab Memo analyzing the results. You can download the template here.
Make sure you document your strategy implementations and interface modifications.
Submit your Lab Memo in PDF format through Moodle.
Resources:
Week 7 (Oct 14 & 16)¶
| Assignment Type | Details | Due Date | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📖 SRG Prep Sheet #6 | Ostrom & Axelrod readings | Tue Oct 16 (start of class) | Participation |
| 🧪 Lab Memo #5 | IPD tournament implementation & analysis | Thu Oct 23 (start of class) | 5% |
Week 8 (Oct 21 & 23)¶
| Assignment Type | Details | Due Date | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🎓 Project Proposal (1 page) | Finalized project scope and cooperation mechanisms | Thu Oct 23 (end of day) | Project milestone |
📚 Reading and Extra Materials¶
Required Readings¶
Robert Axelrod (1984)
The Evolution of Cooperation
Basic Books, Introduction + Chapter 1.
Key concepts:
The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for cooperation
Iterated vs. one-shot interactions
Success of Tit-for-Tat strategy
Evolutionary stability and reciprocity
Discussion questions:
Why does Tit-for-Tat succeed in tournaments despite its simplicity?
How do repeated interactions change cooperation dynamics?
What real-world situations resemble the Prisoner’s Dilemma?
Elinor Ostrom (1990)
Governing the Commons
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1 excerpts.
Key concepts:
Common pool resource dilemmas
Tragedy of the commons vs. successful self-governance
Design principles for stable resource institutions
Polycentric governance systems
Discussion questions:
What makes some communities successfully manage common resources while others fail?
How do Ostrom’s design principles relate to cooperation theory?
Can institutional design overcome individual self-interest?
No new required reading for Week 8
Week 8 focuses on developing your final project proposal. You should:
Review readings from Weeks 1-7 relevant to your project topic
Consult supplementary materials related to your research question
Identify key mechanisms and variables for your model
Prepare your 1-page project proposal
Project Development Resources:
Revisit Axelrod and Ostrom readings for cooperation mechanisms
Explore NetLogo Models Library for similar implementations
Review successful ABM papers in your area of interest
Consider design principles that apply to your research question
Supplementary Materials¶
Nowak, M. A. (2006). “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation”. Science, 314(5805), 1560-1563.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). “Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments”. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.
Axelrod, R. (1980). “Effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3-25.
Ostrom, E. (2009). “A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems”. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Social Science section) - Basic 2-player game
PD Two Person Iterated (Social Science section) - Repeated interactions
Cooperation (Social Science section) - Spatial cooperation
Altruism (Biology section) - Evolutionary cooperation
Historical Context¶
The Development of Cooperation Theory
Game Theory Foundations:
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.
Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. PNAS, 36(1), 48-49.
Tucker, A. W. (1950). A two-person dilemma. Stanford University Press.
Evolutionary Approaches:
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 1-16.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press.
Institutional Analysis:
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.
Real-World Applications¶
Cooperation in Action
Natural Resource Management:
Community forestry and fisheries management
Water allocation and irrigation systems
Common pool resource governance
Climate change cooperation
Organizational Behavior:
Team collaboration and productivity
Corporate social responsibility
Supply chain cooperation
Innovation networks and knowledge sharing
International Relations:
Trade agreements and economic cooperation
Environmental treaties and compliance
Security alliances and peacekeeping
Global governance institutions
Discussion Questions:
Why do some communities successfully manage common resources while others fail?
How can organizations design incentives to promote teamwork?
What role does culture play in cooperation and trust?
How can technology facilitate or hinder cooperative behavior?
Contemporary Challenges:
Digital commons and open source collaboration
Platform cooperatives and gig economy governance
Global cooperation on pandemic response
Corporate cooperation on sustainability goals
Additional Tools & Resources¶
Tools and Software
Interactive Demos:
🖥️ The Evolution of Trust - Interactive cooperation game
🖥️ Prisoner’s Dilemma Lab - Online tournaments and analysis
🖥️ Public Goods Game Simulator - Economic experiment platform
Tools and Software:
💻 Axelrod Python Library: Tournament analysis and strategy development
📊 Gambit: Game theory software for analysis and computation
🎨 NetworkX: Python library for network-based cooperation models
📈 R Cooperation Package: Statistical analysis of cooperation experiments
Study Groups and Office Hours:
👥 Study Group Sessions: Fridays 5-7 PM, Science Building 180
🕐 Instructor Office Hours: Mondays & Wednesdays 3-5 PM
💬 Course Discord: #cooperation-models channel for game theory discussions
📚 Slides and Readings¶
Required Readings¶
Core Reading Materials
Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3-25.
🎯 Focus on: Tournament results and the success of Tit-for-Tat
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. Selected chapters on institutional design principles.
🎯 Focus on: Design principles for stable resource institutions
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560-1563.
🎯 Focus on: Mechanisms that promote cooperation evolution
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.
🎯 Focus on: The role of punishment in maintaining cooperation
Historical Context¶
The Development of Cooperation Theory
Game Theory Foundations:
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.
Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. PNAS, 36(1), 48-49.
Tucker, A. W. (1950). A two-person dilemma. Stanford University Press.
Evolutionary Approaches:
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 1-16.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press.
Institutional Analysis:
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.
Real-World Applications¶
Cooperation in Action
Natural Resource Management:
Community forestry and fisheries management
Water allocation and irrigation systems
Common pool resource governance
Climate change cooperation
Organizational Behavior:
Team collaboration and productivity
Corporate social responsibility
Supply chain cooperation
Innovation networks and knowledge sharing
International Relations:
Trade agreements and economic cooperation
Environmental treaties and compliance
Security alliances and peacekeeping
Global governance institutions
Discussion Questions:
Why do some communities successfully manage common resources while others fail?
How can organizations design incentives to promote teamwork?
What role does culture play in cooperation and trust?
How can technology facilitate or hinder cooperative behavior?
Contemporary Challenges:
Digital commons and open source collaboration
Platform cooperatives and gig economy governance
Global cooperation on pandemic response
Corporate cooperation on sustainability goals
- Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560–1563. 10.1126/science.1133755
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980–994. 10.1257/aer.90.4.980
- Ostrom, E. (2009). A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. Science, 325(5939), 419–422. 10.1126/science.1172133